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Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding: 
Italy’s International Obligations  
ELISA VARI 
Introduction 
In February 2017, Italy entered into an agreement with Libya, the 
Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter, “MoU”), whereby the two 
countries committed to curbing what they referred to as “illegal 
immigration” from the Libyan coast to Italy.1  While Italy is providing the 
North African country with investments to further economic development 
and stability as well as vessels and border security instruments, Libya is 
intercepting boats of migrants at sea and preventing people from departing 
its territory to reach Europe.  The agreement also provides for funding for 
Libyan detention centers and for other organizations engaging in the forced 
as well as voluntary departure of migrants from the country.   
The issues arising from this agreement are plenty.  In recent years 
alone, Libya has been under the scrutiny of non-governmental international 
organizations due to its widespread human rights violations.  Migrants in 
particular are discriminated against, detained in dire conditions, and fall 
prey to human traffickers and crime.  In addition, Libya is reportedly, with 
Italian support, sending migrants back to their countries of origin, without 
any regard to their status or need for international protection, and without 
ensuring that they will be safe if returned.  Italy, along with the rest of the 
international community, is well aware of these issues, yet shuts a blind eye 
to Libya’s draconian measures in dealing with immigrants in order to avoid 
taking the responsibility on itself.2 
 
 1. Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of development, the 
fight against illegal immigration, human trafficking and fuel smuggling and on reinforcing 
the security of borders between the State of Libya and the Italian Republic (2017), 
http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation_ 
finalversion.doc.pdf.  
 2. See EU Shifting Rescue to Libya Risks Lives: Italy Should Direct Safe Rescues, 
Human rights Watch (June 19, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/19/eu-
shifting-rescue-libya-risks-lives (It was reported that a Libyan vessel fired against an Italian 
vessel mistaking it for a boat of migrants, Italian authorities denied this happening). 
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Libya is also controlled by different forces that are fighting to gain 
more power and want to partake in the lucrative business provided by the 
agreement.  Officially, the parties to the MoU are the Italian government 
and the UN-backed Government of National Accord (“GNA”) of Prime 
Minister Fayez al-Serraj.  The GNA is the internationally recognized 
government of Libya and the entity controlling the country.  In reality, 
however, following the 42-year-long government of Muammar Gaddafi, 
the country has been in a status of chaos, and several groups control 
different cities and regions of the country, making it difficult for the GNA 
to gain full control over Libya.  These groups are armed militias, the 
Islamic State, and the General National Congress (GNC), an Islamist-led 
administration based in Tripoli challenging the GNA authority, though 
some of its members have recognized it.3  The GNA is backed by the 
Libyan National Army (LNA), which is supported by different units, 
including some militias.4  Libyan militias are well known for engaging in 
smuggling, human rights abuses and the organized crime that contributes to 
Libyan instability.  There have been allegations of Italy paying some of 
them to take part to its fight against illegal immigration, which caused 
further criticism of Italy’s conduct in the country. 
While Italy is making sure to delegate the “dirty work” of pushing 
away migrants to Libyan authorities and trying to prevent crossings into its 
waters in order to circumvent international obligations, Italy may still be 
held accountable under several international law instruments.  Under the 
Convention Against Torture,5 of which Italy is a party, not only should a 
state not perpetrate the torture and degrading treatment of individuals, but it 
also may not return such individuals to a country where they might suffer 
the same abuses.  The same principle, that of non-refoulement, is expressed 
in the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees6 and the 
related 1967 Protocol. 7  While Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention or the 1967 Protocol, Italy ratified both legal instruments and is 
thus bound by them.  Both treaties forbid state parties from returning to 
their countries of origin those who fear persecution at home on the basis of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
 
 3. Guide to key Libyan militias, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-middle-east-19744533. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 10 Dec. 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (as modified by 24 I.L.M. 
535 (1985)) (entered into force June, 26 1987). 
 6. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954). 
 7. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 
(entered into force Oct. 4, 1967). 
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political opinion. 
Because arguably Italy is not directly engaging in this conduct under 
the agreement, and it is instead paying Libya (with EU support) to do that, 
it might be difficult to prove its direct responsibility under CAT and the 
Refugee Convention and Protocol.  However, the International Law 
Committee’s Articles for State Responsibility provide a legal framework, 
which is widely accepted, that may serve to attach responsibility for these 
acts to Italy due to its heavy financial and logistical contribution to Libya’s 
international law violations.  
This article will thus address, in Part 1, the relevant political and 
historical background, including the recent history of the relations between 
Italy and Libya in terms of migration control.  Part 2 will then outline the 
content of the latest agreement on the matter, and, lastly, Part 3 will 
analyze Italy’s international obligations and the implications emerging 
from the agreement that Italy should take into serious consideration while 
implementing it.  The note will also briefly discuss alternatives and 
solutions that Italy should apply in order to avoid responsibility for human 
rights and international law violations that is likely to attach otherwise. 
1. Background 
The Historical Context: Libya 
Libya is currently in a situation of political confusion, which is very 
much linked to a similarly unruly modern history.  Italy colonized Libya in 
the early 1900s and, during the almost forty-year-long occupation, 
thousands of Libyans died, and indigenous populations were discriminated 
against and largely excluded from the economy.8  When Italy left the 
country in 1951, Libya was left in dire conditions, with high infant 
mortality rates and widespread illiteracy.  The discovery of oil that 
followed brought more business into the country, but also corruption and 
division, which resulted in the 1969 populist revolution.  It was during the 
revolution that Col. Moammar Gaddafi started gaining power, first leading 
the popular revolution, then deposing the king with a military coup and 
finally, once in power, restructuring the country’s politics and reshaping its 
economy in an attempt to create a “stateless society.”  
Gaddafi outlawed political parties and set up revolutionary 
committees to repress opposition and further the regime’s will; private land 
 
 8. David S. Sorenson, A History of Modern Libya (reviewing DIRK VANDEWALLE A 
HISTORY OF MODERN LIBYA 2006)); see also Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2 006-
09-01/history-modern- libya. 
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was confiscated, and independent media was shut down.9  Creating 
independent unions and practicing as private professionals became 
impossible, and doctors, lawyers and others were forced to work for the 
government.10  The government also gained complete control over imports, 
exports and also food rations, which in turn spurred the creation of an 
underground black market.11   
Gaddafi’s radical agenda fueled opposition both inside and outside the 
country.  While the Libyan population was mostly concerned with its 
leader’s draconian actions, the rest of the world saw the country as a 
sponsor of terrorism.  When the Arab Spring started, therefore, Gaddafi’s 
government was not immune from popular upheaval, and, with NATO’s 
intervention on the side of Libyans, Gaddafi’s government crumbled, and 
he was killed shortly thereafter in 2011.12 
Following Gaddafi’s ousting, Libya remains a country without a 
government that has authority over its entire territory.  Though elected and 
internationally backed, the GNA struggles to keep a hold of the country, 
while rival militias and the Islamist-led administration in Tripoli continue 
to exert influence and power in large areas and towns across Libya, and 
militias keep engaging in contraband, human trafficking, and smuggling of 
migrants and supplies.13   
Italy’s Immigration Dilemma  
Italy has been the destination or way station of many migrants over 
the past few decades.  Immigrants have come mostly from North Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, looking to either stay or to 
make their way to wealthier northern European countries.14  Following the 
Arab Spring, migration from North-African and Middle Eastern countries 
to Europe has intensified, and Italy’s geographical position at the border of 
the EU and right on the Mediterranean have made it one of the most 
 
 9. Karim Mezran, Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi, MIDDLE EAST POLICY 
COUNCIL, http://www.mepc.org/libya-rise-and-fall-qaddafi. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Martin Asser, The Muammar Gaddafi Story, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12688033. 
 13. Floor El Kamouni-Janssen and Kars de Bruijne, CrisesAlert 3, Entering the Lion’s 
Den: local militias and governance in Libya, CLINGENDAEL REPORT (2017), https://www. 
clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/crisesalert-3-entering-the-lions-den-local-militi 
as-and-governance-in-libya.pdf. 
 14. Angelo Scotto, From Emigration to Asylum Destination, Italy Navigates Shifting 
Migration Tides, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.mig 
rationpolicy.org/article/emigration-asylum-destination-italy-navigates-shifting-migration-
tides. 
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attractive ports of entry to the old continent.15  During 2015 and 2016, 
335,000 irregular migrants reached Italy’s shores via the Mediterranean, 
putting a strain on the Italian immigration system and contributing to the 
recent European migration crisis.16   
In 2013, following a shipwreck near the island of Lampedusa where 
366 people died, Italy set up a Search And Rescue program, “Mare 
Nostrum” (“Our Sea”), whereby the Italian Coast Guard and the Navy 
helped and brought to its shores more than 160,000 migrants.17  The 
program was praised internationally, so much that the EU took it over and 
created Triton, a similar initiative whose primary purpose, however, is not, 
like Mare Nostrum, to rescue migrants, but rather to monitor irregular 
crossings over the Mediterranean.18   
Italy has made commitments to refugees through its ratification of 
international instruments.  Other than creating the rescue system of Mare 
Nostrum, Italy implemented policies and laws in accordance with 
international conventions related to the protection of refugees once they 
reach the Italian territory.  Italy set up its national asylum system in 2001.  
Those seeking to obtain refugee status may apply upon entry or at a police 
station.19  The applicant is then interviewed to verify his or her identity and 
whether he or she was in other EU states before entering Italy.20  Despite a 
30-day term for a hearing to take place, applications often remain pending 
for over thirty days, and up to 18 months.21  During this time, many asylum 
seekers (particularly those who applied after being stopped by authorities in 
the country or upon entry and found to be present illegally) remain in 
detention for several months and receive little to no updates on the status of 
their case.22  Once a decision is reached, an asylum-seeker may appeal 
within 30 days, or 15 if he or she is in detention.23  About 30,000 people 
 
 15. Scotto, supra note 14. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Redazione Ansa, Da Mare Nostrum a Triton, le differenze, ANSA.IT, (Jul. 9, 
2017, 6:03 PM), http://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2015/04/19/da-mare-nostrum-a-trito 
n-le- differenze_e5692d7c-0511-411e-a819-5393560575ba.html. 
 18. Id. 
 19. ASGI, Short Overview of the Asylum Procedure, Italy, AIDA Asylum Information 
Database, http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy/asylum-procedure/general/ 
short-overview-asylum-procedure. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Corallina Lopez Curzi, Come in Carcere, Ma Senza i Diritti dei Detenuti, OPEN 
MIGRATION (June 9, 2017), https://openmigration.org/analisi/come-in-carcere-ma-senza-i-
diritti-dei-detenuti/; Refugee Law and Policy: Italy, Library of Congress, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/italy.php [last updated June 21, 2016]. 
 23. ASGI, supra note 19. 
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applied for asylum annually between 2000 and 2010.24 
In response to the recent European refugee crisis in 2015, the Italian 
public has displayed growing sentiments of xenophobia and racism, which 
led populist and far-right parties to gather consensus by pushing an anti-
immigration agenda.25  This motivated the left-wing Italian government to, 
on the one hand, ask the EU and other member states for more cooperation 
and support on migration, while, on the other hand, approving more 
restrictive immigration policies.26  It is in this context that Italy struck a 
deal with Libya to curb illegal immigration through the MoU, which some 
argue was a way for the government to prove its strength and decisiveness 
on the issue.   
2. The Agreement  
Italian-Libyan Cooperation: A Brief History  
Italy and Libya initiated cooperation agreements on migration in the 
early 2000s, pledging to fight terrorism, organized crime, drug-trafficking, 
and illegal migration.  Numerous similar agreements followed, many of 
which are still unpublished.27  The most prominent agreements are the 2000 
and 2003 agreements, the 2006 Memorandum for the cooperation against 
illegal migration, the 2007 Protocol and Additional Protocol to the 2006 
Memorandum, the 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation, the 2009 Executive Agreement, and, lastly, the 2017 
Memorandum of Understanding.  
As part of their first bilateral agreement of December 2000, the two 
countries committed to assisting each other in the effort to curb irregular 
migration and exchanging information.28  In 2003, Libya and Italy defined 
in more details how to operationalize the 2000 agreement.  Neither the 
2000 nor the 2003 agreement were published.29  
In 2006, the countries signed a Memorandum for the cooperation 
 
 24. Scotto, supra note 14.  
 25. Id.; see also Patrick Strickland, How Italy’s Far Right Exploits the Migration 
Crisis, AL-JAZEERA (Jan. 15, 2018), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/italy-exploits-
migration-crisis-180114200719130.html. 
 26. Scotto, supra note 14.  
 27. Mariagiulia Giuffré, State Responsibility Beyond Borders: What Legal Basis for 
Italy’s Push Backs to Libya?, 24 INTL. JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 692, 692-734 (2012).  
 28. Accordo tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica Popolare 
Socialista per la Collaborazione nella Lotta al Terrorismo, alla Criminalità Organizzata, al 
Traffico Illegale di Stupefacenti e Sostanze Psicotrope e All’Immigrazione Clandestina 
(Rome, 13 Dec 2000). 
 29. Giuffré, supra note 27. 
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against illegal migration which then resulted in the 2007 Protocol and 
Additional Protocol.30  Libya and Italy reaffirmed the commitments made 
in 2000 and established a joint mission whereby Libya would patrol its 
coastline and international waters, while Italy would supply it with vessels 
on a temporary basis.31  One year later, in 2008, the countries signed a 
Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation (hereinafter “TFPC”) in 
Tripoli,32 and in 2009 they signed an executive agreement to enforce the 
2007 Protocol.33   
The 2007 Protocol and Additional Protocol entrusted Libyan 
authorities with large control over maritime missions, with Italian officials 
joining Libyan authorities on board only to provide training and give 
technical support.  Libyan authorities would intercept boats of migrants and 
take them back to its coast prior to reaching Italian territorial waters, 
relieving Italy from exercising legal authority over those returned to 
Libya.34  Therefore, Italy would avoid either taking the migrants it stopped 
into its territory, or returning them to Libya and facing the possibility of 
breaching its international obligations.35  What was Libya to do with those 
halted and returned to its territory, however, was not specified.   
The 2008 TFPC reiterated the two countries’ relationship generally.  
Italy and Libya agreed to move past old hostilities, most notably the 
suffering caused to Libya by Italian colonization.36  They also agreed to 
engage in regional cooperation, and Italy committed itself to bringing 
investments and substantial financing to Libya.37  The countries also 
reaffirmed principles such as respect for sovereign equality, prohibition of 
the threat or use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for 
human rights (Art. 6 of the TFPC) and fundamental freedoms.38   
Within the TFPC chapter regarding partnership and immigration, Art. 
19 committed the parties to collaborating to prevent illegal immigration in 
 
 30. Protocollo tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica 
Popolare Socialista (Tripoli, 29 Dec 2007); Protocollo Aggiuntivo Tecnico-Operativo al 
Protocollo di Cooperazone tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria Araba Libica 
Popolare Socialista, per fronteggiare il fenomeno dell′immigrazione Clandestina (Tripoli, 
29 Dec 2007). 
 31. Id.; see also Natalino Ronzitti, The Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation in the 
Mediterranean?, 1 BULLETIN OF ITALIAN POLITICS, 125, 125-133 (2009).  
 32. Trattato di Amicizia, Partenariato, e Cooperazione (Bengazi, 30 Aug 2008), 
ratified by Italy with Law No. 2009/7 (TFPC). 
 33. Giuffré, supra note 27. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Ronzitti, supra note 31. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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the countries of origin of the migratory flows through bilateral and regional 
initiatives, such as the patrolling of the Libyan coast by mixed crews on 
boats provided by Italy, and the implementation of a satellite detection 
system to control Libyan land borders financed by Italy and the EU.39 
Through the 2009 Executive Protocol40 enforcing the 2007 Protocol 
and Additional Protocol, Italy started supplying Libya with six Italian 
vessels on a permanent basis, making Libya’s participation on illegal 
immigration control more proactive and paving the way for push-back 
practices.41  Most notably, none of these protocols and agreements made 
the important distinction between asylum seekers and other irregular 
migrants.42  This relationship was temporarily suspended in 2012, due to 
the outbreak of a civil war in Libya and the ECtHR judgement Hirsi et al. 
v. Italy condemning the interception and return of migrants to Libya by 
Italy (explored further below).43  
The 2017 Memorandum of Understanding  
The current agreement, which is the object of this note, was finalized 
in February 2017 as the Memorandum of Understanding, and is meant to 
extend and incorporate the commitments made in the 2008 TFPC.44 
According to the MoU, Italy will be providing Libyan authorities with 
training and equipment, while also investing to help Libya improve border 
security and combat smuggling of people, and engage the Libyan 
government in smuggling hubs.45   
The document is three pages long, and includes eight articles.  The 
first two articles iterate the two countries’ commitments and encourage 
starting cooperation efforts in accordance with the 2008 TFPC.  In Art. 1, 
 
 39. Ronzitti, supra note 31. 
 40. Protocollo Aggiuntivo Tecnico-Operativo concernente l’aggiunta di un articolo al 
Protocollo firmato a Tripoli il 29/12/2007 tra la Repubblica Italiana e la Gran Giamahiria 
Araba Libica Popolare Socialista, per fronteggiare il fenomeno dell′immigrazione 
clandestina (Tripoli, 4 Feb 2009). 
 41. Giuffré, supra note 27. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Anja Palm, The Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding: The baseline of a 
policy approach aimed at closing all doors to Europe?, ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI 
(Oct. 2, 2017), http://www.iai.it/it/pubblicazioni/italy-libya-memorandum-understanding-
baseline-policy-approach-aimed-closing-all-doors. 
 44. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 1 (The introduction to the MoU 
recites “In order to implement the relevant agreements undersigned by the Parties, among 
which the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation signed in Bengasi on August 
30th 2008 — in particular with respect to Article 19 of the same Treaty —, and the Tripoli 
Declaration of January 21st 2012 as well as other agreements and memoranda on the 
subject.”). 
 45. Id. 
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Italy promises financial investments in the areas affected by illegal 
migration for industries such as renewable energy and infrastructure so as 
to create new jobs and substitute smuggling as a source of revenue.  Italy 
also promised technical support to Libyan institutions that work on curbing 
illegal migration.  Art. 2 has the parties commit to completing the land 
border control satellite detection system as foreseen in Art. 19 of the TFPC.  
Under the same article, Italy also agrees to finance existing “hosting 
centers” for migrants and to supply them with medical equipment.  Both 
parties commit to ensuring that Libyan personnel in the hosting centers is 
trained to “face illegal immigrants’ conditions.”  They also commit to 
adopting a “wider and more complete Euro-African cooperation view, to 
eliminate the causes of irregular immigration,” supporting countries of 
origin and improving their life standards and employment rates.  Both 
parties agree to support organizations in Libya that return migrants to their 
country of origin, “including voluntary return.”46  Lastly, they will start 
development programs in Libya to create jobs and income and replace 
contraband and human trafficking that militias and irregular local groups 
largely benefit from.47  
Art. 3 encourages the creation of a committee to oversee the 
implementation of the agreement, Art. 4 deals with the financing, Art. 5 
iterates the parties’ commitment to interpret and apply the MoU in 
accordance with international and human rights obligations.  The last three 
articles deal with the agreement’s enforcement mechanisms and other 
procedural matters.  The overall language of the MoU is broad and 
sometimes legally imprecise.48  Certain issues, such as what projects 
exactly the agreement is meant to support and how much funds Italy is 
supposed to provide and where they would come from, are really unclear.49  
The MoU fails, just like its predecessors, to ever distinguish asylum seekers 
from economic and other irregular migrants.50   
Although the agreement does not specify whether Libyan authorities 
should intercept migrants already en route to Italy and at sea, this goal can 
be inferred from the fact that Italy will be providing Libya with boats and 
border control systems “in order to stem the illegal migrants’ fluxes” (Art. 
1).  It is equally likely that, in order for Italy to avoid any responsibility 
under international law, Libya will be intercepting boats before they reach 
 
 46. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 1. 
 47. Declan Walsh and Jason Horowitz, Italy, Going it Alone, Stalls the Flow of 
Migrants. But at What Cost?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 
09/17/world/europe/italy-libya-migrant-crisis.html. 
 48. Palm, supra note 43. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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Italian territorial waters.  In addition, there are already reports of Libyan 
authorities and border patrol agents intercepting in Libyan waters migrants’ 
boats traveling to Italy.51  Furthermore, by mentioning funding for 
organizations in Libya that engage in the return (whether voluntary or 
forcible) of migrants to their country of origin, Art. 2 of the MoU explicitly 
identifies forcible returns (refoulement) as one of its main goals.52  
Therefore, though the agreement does not speak precisely as to what Libya 
is to do with the migrants it intercepts, it seems clear that the ultimate goal 
is to detain and eventually return migrants to their countries of origin, 
especially given Italy’s commitment to finance detention centers and 
support organizations that facilitate migrants’ return to their country of 
origin.53  The agreement never mentions actions to identify potential 
refugees among the migrants or to ensure that those returned are headed to 
a safe country, despite Italy being party, as previously mentioned, to 
several human rights conventions that oblige it to take these steps.   
All in all, the MoU is focused on curbing migration flows to Italy and 
supporting development in Libya, and, while the operations mentioned 
point at efforts to stem flows of migrants from Libya to Europe, it looks 
like a lot of attention is directed towards securing Libya’s borders to stop 
that phenomenon from the outset, no matter the costs.54  
In the past few years, Italy has been more and more vocal regarding its 
need for a solution to the heavy fluxes of migrants crossing the 
Mediterranean to reach its borders.  As previously mentioned, the country 
has been praised on several occasions for its rescue operations, which have 
saved countless lives at sea.55  However, Italy continued to stress that it 
could not bear the burden of helping and taking illegal migrants in such 
large numbers, and called for the EU to provide a durable solution in many 
occasions.56   
In response to the recent “refugee crisis” and to the “border 
 
 51. Libya: European governments complicit in horrific abuses of refugees and 
migrants, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, (Dec. 12, 2017, 00:01 AM[Double check the time; or 
delet time]), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/12/ libya-european-governments-
complicit-in-horrific-abuse-of-refugees-and-migrants/; see also More than 300 migrants 
intercepted in boats off Libya: coastguard, REUTERS (Feb. 19, 2018, 9:58 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya/more-than-300-migrants-intercep 
ed-in-boats-off-libya-coastguard-idUSKCN1G31XJ.  
 52. Palm, supra note 43. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Steve Scherer and Massimiliano di Giorgio, Italy to end sea rescue mission that 
saved 100,000 migrants, REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2014, 11:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-italy-migrants-eu/italy-to-end-sea-rescue-mission-that-saved-100000-migrants-id 
USKBN0IK22220141031. 
 56. Id. 
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countries’” cry for help, the EU struck a contentious deal with Turkey, that, 
similar to the agreement between Italy and Libya, attempts at moving 
border control efforts away from the EU territory, so as to avoid the 
international and EU obligations that come from receiving migrants – and 
particularly asylum seekers.57  Border externalization efforts have been a 
common phenomenon in recent years, whereby agreements are made 
between a state trying to avoid immigration influxes and a third state that 
agrees to keep migrants within its territory and “take care” of them.58  This 
is due to the presumption that the former state would then be freed of all 
international obligations towards the people who remain in the third 
country.59  However, as discussed below, this is not necessarily the case.  
According to the EU-Turkey deal, asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants who reached Greece could be returned to Turkey, and, in 
exchange, Turkey received € 6 billion to assist refugees as well as travel 
visas for Turkish nationals.60  This deal is problematic for several reasons.  
Primarily, Turkey has been accused of failing to provide adequate 
assistance to refugees, since, despite being party to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and 1967 Protocol, it only offers temporary protection rather 
than full refugee status.61  In addition, in transferring asylum seekers from 
Greece to Turkey, the EU has been effectively engaging in the refoulement 
of refugees.  EU law prohibits this conduct, except where refugees are 
returned to a “safe country.”  Obviously, the EU is justifying its actions by 
claiming that Turkey is in fact a safe country, but the reception of migrants 
and refugees in Turkey seem to show that this assumption is flawed.62  
Under the deal, the EU also promised that it would eventually provide a 
safe, legal way out of Turkey for refugees to come to Europe.  In reality, 
 
 57. See, e.g., Bill Frelick, Iam M. Kysel, and Jennifer Podkul, The Impact of 
Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other Migrants, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WAATCH (Dec. 6 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw. 
org/news/2016/12/06/impact-externalization- migration-controls-rights-asylum-seekers-and-
other-migrants. 
 58. See Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul, supra note 57 (for more details of externalization 
of migration controls). 
 59. Giuffré, supra note 27; see also Palm, supra note 43. 
 60. Kondylia Gogou, The EU-Turkey Deal: Europe’s Year of Shame, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 20, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/ 
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 61. Turkey, UNHCR Global Appeal 2008-2009, 304-307, http://www.unhcr.org/ 
474ac8e60.pdf; http://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey; see also 
Gogou, supra note 60.  
 62. Elizabeth Collett, The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, MIGRATION 
POLICY INSTITUTE (Mar. 2016), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-
refugee-deal; Gogou, supra note 60.  
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the number of those transferred to EU territory remained small.63 
Because the MoU seeks to enforce migration control mechanisms 
beyond the EU borders, it has been compared to the EU-Turkey deal, but it 
appears as a “bad replica” of it.64  In fact, while the Turkey deal at least 
included resettlement operations, no such commitment made it to the MoU.  
As already mentioned, the MoU also does not mention the words ‘refugee’ 
or ‘legal migration,’ but instead uses the blanket term “illegal 
immigration.”65  Further, while the EU-Turkey deal mapped funding 
amounts, projects and partners in detail, this clarity is lacking in the MoU, 
which very vaguely mentions EU funds and Italian funding for the various 
projects of the memorandum.66  Lastly, the political and human rights 
situation in Libya, as this paper will discuss, is far worse than the one in 
Turkey.  The agreement’s promise to uphold international and human rights 
obligations is no guarantee.  While the UNHCR is active in Turkey, 
refugees in Libya cannot apply for protection with the government, which 
does not have an asylum system in place, nor with the UN agency, which 
has had troubles operating in the country.67  The lack of a legal framework 
ensuring refugee protection, according to observers, will likely result in 
Libya engaging in chain-refoulement.68   
The existing legal framework on immigration in the country, in fact, 
fails to distinguish between people seeking international protection and all 
other migrants.69 Instead, it categorizes every person who enters in 
violation of migration provisions as an illegal migrant and criminalizes 
such conduct.70  The penalty for entering illegally, according to a rough 
translation of the relevant laws, is imprisonment and forced labor or a fine 
or both; after serving their sentence, illegal migrants will then be 
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 64. Palm, supra note 43; see also Katie Kuschminder, Why the EU Plan to Stop 
Mediterranean Migration is a Human Rights Concern, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2017, 
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 65. Palm, supra note 43. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Kuschminder, supra note 64. 
 68. Palm, supra note 43. 
 69. See Libya Immigration Detention, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT (last updated: 
Feb. 2015), https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/libya. (In 2004, the 
European Commission observed that “detainees were arrested at random and issued 
deportation orders based on decisions made for groups of nationalities, rather than 
individual cases.”). 
 70. Id. 
6. Vari - HICLR Vol.43-1.docx 11/12/2019  11:20 AM 
Winter 2020] Italy’s International Obligations 117 
expelled.71  There seems to be no specific legal provision on administrative 
immigration detention for immigration reasons, so detention for conduct 
that is not criminal is imposed without a judicial order and legal process; 
observers argue that immigration detention occurs in a “legal vacuum” and, 
most times, arbitrarily.72  Moreover, the existing laws seem to imply that 
detention may be of indefinite length.73  Technically, the country’s Ministry 
of Interior’s Department for Combating Illegal Immigration (DCIM) is the 
authority in charge of Libya’s detention facilities; however, since the 
ousting of Gaddafi, militias have taken control over several of these 
facilities.74   
Refugee International, an international NGO working on refugee and 
migration issues, interviewed several migrants in Tunisia and Italy who had 
been detained or held captive in Libya by smugglers and law 
enforcement.75  The report produced by the organization shows that the 
people returned to Libya or who enter Libya illegally and are captured are 
put into detention with no legal recourse or judicial hearing, they are held 
for months in conditions that lead many to die out of illnesses, where 
sexual abuse of both women and men is widespread, and where no 
protection is available for those seeking asylum.76  Migrants are usually 
threatened and subject to extortion, forced to pay smugglers affiliated with 
local militias (or police officers, but there seems to be little difference 
between the two categories in practice) only to be able to get to the next 
step to reach Europe, if they are lucky.77  For these and other reasons that 
this note will analyze, the MoU between Italy and Libya raised a series of 
concerns. 
Aftermath of the MoU 
In the first ten days of August 2017 alone, experts observed a drop in 
migrant crossings of the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy of 76% 
compared to August of the previous year.78  In November 2017, the 
Committee Against Torture considered the fifth and sixth periodic reports 
submitted by Italy regarding its implementation and compliance with the 
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Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment (“CAT”), which will be discussed below.  In its discussion with 
Italy, the Committee asked the party to justify this significant drop in the 
number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean from Libya and it asked 
whether the drop was connected to the MoU.79  The Italian representatives 
asserted that the decrease in crossings was due to the “stabilization” 
accomplished by Libya with Italy’s help, and also to Italy’s ongoing 
dialogue with countries of origin of the migratory flows.  
Some experts believe, however, that there are less people willing to 
cross the Mediterranean from Libya, and it is unclear why.80  For example, 
there has been a significant drop in individuals migrating to Libya from 
Niger, due, allegedly, to anti-smuggling deals that Niger entered into with 
neighboring countries and the EU.81  These deals prompted Niger to pass 
laws against migrant smuggling, and to increase arrests of smugglers and 
vehicle confiscations, thus reducing the number of those leaving its 
territory.82  The Libyan coastguard trained by Italy turning back 60% of 
ships leaving the Libyan coast, however, remains a major factor of the 
decrease in the number of crossings.   
Following the agreement, Italy has been accused of paying Libyan 
militias to provide additional control over migration fluxes, negotiating 
with them through mayors and local leaders to secure their support.83  
Militias in Libya are composed of numerous armed groups organized in 
coalitions in order to exert influence over a given territory.  Their interests 
vary so much over time that it is difficult to discern and divide militias 
based on their goals and objectives.84  Similarly, these groups cannot be 
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narrowly categorized as criminal, government allied, or irregular.85  In fact, 
“many militias wear different hats at the same time,” defending different 
interests and siding with different parties, and ultimately “overruling any 
political actors.”86  
For these reasons, the sudden cooperation between different rival 
militias across Libya that was observed after June 2017 raised suspicions, 
and it was suggested that it was caused by a deal struck with the Italian 
Security Services.87  If this is true, this means that the smugglers who were 
previously paid by migrants to cross the Mediterranean are now being paid 
by Italy to prevent that same conduct.  While Italy denies these claims, 
militias have practically become part of the GNA security forces.88  This 
seems to not only give irregular militant groups legitimacy, but to also 
hinder the GNA’s efforts to integrate the country’s security sector, as while 
some of the militias are considered part of the official security forces, they 
continue to pursue their agenda, smuggling subsidized fuel and other 
produces.89   
The number of crossings started rising again in September, and 
observers connected this rise with a power struggle between rival gangs 
and militias in Sabratha, one of Libya’s main human-trafficking ports.  
Sabratha, located in the northwest part of the country and facing the 
Mediterranean, has allegedly been for years the point of departure of 
smugglers.  Several factions operate in the area, mainly the Dabbashi gang, 
which has profited for years from smuggling people, as well as fuel, across 
the Mediterranean.90  When boats stopped leaving the port, the gang 
claimed it had agreed with the GNA Interior Ministry to put off its 
smuggling activities in return for money.91  However, this has caused 
power struggles and fights between the Dabbashi Clan and rival groups that 
also want to take part in the profitable business provided by the Italy-Libya 
deal.92  In addition, the migrants who are prevented from leaving are 
instead often locked up in detention centers controlled by militias.93 
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Despite the allegations that Italy is paying and making deals with 
militias, the Italian government has repeatedly stated that, other than 
offering medical supplies and other forms of assistance, it has not directly 
paid these groups to carry out operations to curb immigration, but solely 
the Libyan government.94  Still, Italy is financing the GNA that is in turn 
entering into deals with irregular militias and paying them to accomplish 
the goals under the MoU.95   
Gen. Khalifa Haftar, leader of the Libyan National Army, claims he 
has been in touch with Italian authorities trying to get a piece of the pie: he 
could control the southern border of the country if Europe delivers money 
and security supplies.96  Haftar also openly criticized Italy’s engagement 
with these groups, because “[p]aying them means entering a vicious 
circle.97  Tomorrow they will fight one another for the rewards and then ask 
for more money. It will lead to infinite blackmail.”98  Observers are also 
skeptical as to the reliability of these groups, as the GNA has very little 
control over them and, in the past, they have tended to adapt and find new 
smuggling routes to continue their activities.99  
The MoU was challenged in both Libya and Italy by different refugee 
rights and political groups.  In Libya, the Tripoli Court of Appeal 
temporarily suspended the agreement due to humanitarian concerns and 
constitutional ones.  On the one hand, the agreement was not unanimously 
approved by the House of Representatives and the State Council, meaning 
that al-Serraj did not have the authority to make this agreement.100  On the 
other hand, there was concern over the risk of migrants staying in Libya 
and being detained in centers funded by Italy.101  The suspension, however, 
did not last long, and the Libyan Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s 
ruling.102  
Last September, the Italian Radical Party brought a lawsuit to the 
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Republic’s Procura (the public prosecutor’s office) challenging the 
constitutionality of the agreement, as Art. 80 of the Italian Constitution 
requires international agreements to be ratified by the Parliament.103  In 
addition, Asgi (the Italian Association for Juridical Studies) petitioned 
before the Latium Administrative Tribunal to block the deal, claiming that 
the government is misplacing funds by providing Libyan authorities with 
training and equipment and enabling the violation of fundamental human 
rights.104  In March 2017, the Libyan PM al-Serraj presented a list to Italy 
with all the funding and supplies he expects Libyan authorities to be 
provided with in accordance with the MoU.  The list includes ten vessels, 
ten patrol boats, four helicopters, twenty-four rafts, ten ambulances, thirty 
jeeps, fifteen cars, thirty satellite phones, and other items, which amount to 
a total of 800 million euros.105  The money is allocated from the Italian-
government-issued African Fund,106 which was meant to promote 
development initiatives to improve cooperation with African states that are 
of great importance to migration routes.107  This goal, Asgi argues, is very 
distant from the projects that would be financed in Libya, that is border 
patrolling and fighting migrant trafficking.108  
For its part, in line with its approach in Turkey, the EU has backed 
Italy’s efforts in Libya, but has let Italy take the lead in the accord.109  The 
EU also expressed support for the Libyan PM al-Serraj, as well as for the 
militias running some of the detention centers in the country, though EU 
officials have denied, just as Italy did, any funding from the EU going to 
militias.110  Italy was instead strongly criticized for the agreement by the 
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international community due to the widespread human rights violations 
perpetrated by Libyan authorities at sea and within the country.  Most 
importantly, because of the large amount of assistance that Italy is giving 
Libya in perpetrating these actions, it seems unlikely that Italy will escape 
scrutiny by international observers regarding its obligations under 
international law.  
3. Italy’s International Obligations 
Italy and the Convention Against Torture 
Italy ratified the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment in 1989.  CAT defined torture as: 
 
“any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes 
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a 
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted 
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”111 
 
Further, it established that state parties may not “expel, return, or 
extradite to a State where there are grounds to believe the individual 
returned will be subjected to torture.”112  Art. 3 further states that “in 
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall 
take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, 
the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”  These provisions were finally 
incorporated in Italian law only last year in July in art.613-bis of the Penal 
Code.  UN officials and observers, however, have taken the position that 
art.613-bis is incomplete and not fully in compliance with the Convention.  
Observers claim that, for example, the torture definition requires verifiable 
psychological damages — but how do you verify these damages when 
court proceedings may occur years after torture was inflicted on the 
victim?113  Still, Italy has been bound by CAT principles well before 
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enacting art.613-bis, since the prohibition of torture has the force of jus 
cogens and at the very least customary international law.114 
In any case, the MoU obviously seems at the very least in contrast 
with the underlying principles of CAT, that is, protecting individuals from 
torture and degrading treatment.  In fact, the agreement purports to fund 
Libyan detention centers and keep migrants within the Libyan borders, but 
numerous international organizations have reported over time that the 
detention conditions in Libya are far too appalling, and that the treatment of 
migrants in the country in general is degrading.  According to the IOM, 
about 416,566 migrants were on Libyan territory by the end of September 
2017, and about 20,000 were in detention around November 2017.115 
Despite Libya ratifying CAT, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) reports 
that migrants in Libya are detained arbitrarily, with no recourse to the legal 
system, in conditions that fall well below appropriate health and safety 
standards.116  Cells are small to the point that people cannot stretch out at 
night, malnutrition is widespread due to food shortages, and detention 
conditions are generally so squalid as to cause or at least contribute to 
illnesses and infections.117  “Detainees are stripped of any human dignity, 
exposed to abusive treatment and lack adequate access to medical care,” 
asserted a medical advisor for MSF.118  Overcrowding, poor ventilation, 
and limited natural light add to the already grim conditions of detention 
centers.119  Other issues are the physical abuse perpetrated by detention 
centers’ staff against detainees and the endemic racism that causes further 
mistreatment of black migrants.120  One woman told Amnesty International 
that a pregnant woman in detention was beaten to death by Libyan 
officials.121  
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In November 2017, CNN published a video showing two migrants in 
Tripoli being sold as slaves for the equivalent of 800 US dollars.122  One of 
them was being auctioned to work on a farm.123  CNN was told of nine 
different locations across Libya where slave auctions were supposedly 
occurring.124  In many cases, those sold as slaves end up being forced into 
prostitution and sexual exploitation in order to be released by their 
smugglers, or die while crossing the desert en route to Europe killed either 
by thirst or by their captors.125  Following the CNN report, the Libyan 
government initiated investigations on the matter.126  
As previously mentioned, the Committee Against Torture recently 
considered Italy’s fifth and sixth reports on its compliance with CAT.127  
Together with other considerations related to the Convention, the 
Committee addressed the MoU, and reminded the state party that despite its 
obligations to Libya under the agreement, Italy could not disregard its 
international human rights obligations.128  The Committee also highlighted 
the fact that the UN Support Mission to Libya showed extensively that 
conditions suffered by migrants in Libyan detention centers and in the 
country generally are extremely reprehensible and appalling.129   
In response to the Committee’s concerns, the Italian representatives 
stressed that the agreement is a memorandum of understanding and 
therefore not binding, and, because the plans under the agreement were 
developed “hand in hand” with the European Commission, the EU could 
decide to end the project at any time.130  The representatives stressed that 
Italy had voiced its concerns for human rights violations in Libya “in every 
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forum,” and it had asked of all stakeholders to participate in developing 
better detention conditions in the country.131  The representatives believed 
that just because Libya is in a difficult situation that should not prevent 
Italy from carrying out initiatives in cooperation with the EU to fight 
smuggling and human trafficking and provide the necessary instruments for 
Libya to address the situation.132  The Italian delegation reiterated that Italy 
is taking a comprehensive approach to foster development in the country, 
which would in turn provide jobs for migrants.133  It also noted that the 
financial support provided “ha[s] to go hand in hand with efforts to provide 
adequate conditions for migrants,” and that humanitarian assistance for 
migrants was one of the pillars of the EU efforts in the country.134   
The Committee noted, however, that in promoting Italy’s plan in 
Libya, the EU was really trying to transfer its border control to Libya.135  It 
also suggested that the drop in the number of crossings were in reality a 
result of Italy’s effort to “farm out” the problem of illegal migration and of 
the increased number of migrants detained in Libya, not of the stability 
brought in Libya, as Italy claimed.136  In fact, the Committee expressed its 
concerns over reports of smugglers being paid to keep migrants in the 
country.  One Committee expert reminded Italy that the EU was yet to do 
something on the inhumane detention conditions in Libya, expressed that 
“[s]omething was not working in the implementation of Italy’s cooperation 
agreement with Libya, which has assumed the role of an external border of 
the EU.”137  The expert further asked if Italy was unable to demand that 
Libya upheld human rights in its detention centers, and if it could move 
from denouncing the violations to acting on them.  “Italy ha[s] to review its 
migration and cooperation policies, and its legal responsibilities.”138  
The delegation responded that two thirds of the funding provided to 
Libya focused on the respect of human rights and assistance to migrants, 
and that a monitoring committee will observe whether conditions appear 
deficient.  If so, the European Commission would be able to suspend the 
project in the country.139  In response to the Committee’s accusations that 
the agreement is an instrument for border externalization, the 
representatives noted that the “concept of moving borders [runs] counter to 
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the principle of national sovereignty,” maybe in an attempt to indicate that 
border externalization is not among Italy’s goals.140  Further, all the 
operations intercepting migrant boats at sea had been conducted by Libya 
within its national waters, without Italy’s assistance, and were therefore 
outside of Italy’s control.141 
Despite Italy’s displayed openness to dialogue on the matter and its 
claims before the Committee, the fact remains that nowhere in the MoU did 
Italy condition its funds on Libya’s compliance with human rights, and, as 
the expert on the Committee asserted, neither Italy nor the EU have done 
anything so far to ensure compliance.142  That Libyan authorities continue 
to engage in human rights violations is well-known, yet the agreement is 
still standing.  Further, that Italy is not in control of what Libyan border 
patrol officials do in Libyan waters seems like a very weak argument when 
Italy is directly providing Libya with the funds to conduct its sea 
operations.  Lastly, it is clear that the principle of national sovereignty 
ceases to be so pressing when a country feels it is able to surrender its 
international responsibilities by transferring its border control to another 
country.  
Libya is quite clearly engaged in violations of CAT, in that it is 
detaining individuals under degrading conditions in violation of Art. 1 of 
the Convention, and returning them to their countries of origin where there 
is a high likelihood they will be harmed.143  Libya could ascertain if 
migrants will be harmed if returned by, as prescribed under Art.3, verifying 
whether there is a pattern of gross, inhuman, or degrading treatment in the 
countries it is sending migrants back to.  Instead, where it is not detaining 
them, Libya is returning migrants to their country of origin without first 
making sure that they are not going to be persecuted or harmed once they 
are sent back.144  Libya’s conduct has already been largely criticized, and 
NGOs operating in the country keep reporting on the human rights abuses 
perpetuated by Libyan authorities.145  
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As to Italy, while CAT alone might be insufficient to challenge Italy’s 
conduct of aiding Libyan violations to an international forum, Amnesty 
International condemned the “de facto complicity or participation of Italian 
authorities in the torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of 
refugees and migrants in Libya as a result of its cooperation with Libyan 
authorities on border control.”146  In fact, the Convention may still serve as 
the basis to hold Italy responsible under the concept of state responsibility, 
as we will see later on.  
Protection of Refugees and the Principle of Non-Refoulement 
Italy is a party to both international treaties on refugees, that are the 
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol.  These 
treaties established the existence of a protected category of migrants, 
identified as refugees, which includes those who: 
 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a 
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it.”147   
Refugees are entitled to special protections under international law 
that “economic migrants” (those seeking a better job or life based on 
economic reasons) and others (migrants that do not fall under the refugee 
definition) do not have.  The principle of non-refoulement is one of the 
most important protections afforded to refugees, but it is also expressed in 
Art. 3 of CAT, and thus not limited to them.  This principle was first 
adopted in Art. 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention,148 but is also addressed 
in other international instruments that bind Italy to abide by it.  Under Art. 
19 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights “[n]o one may be removed, 
expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she 
would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”149  Art. 3 of the European Convention 
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on Human Rights (ECHR) also prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment.150  Lastly, Art. 4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR prohibits the 
collective expulsion of aliens.151 
It is under these last two principles that in 2012, in Hirsi et al. v. Italy, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) condemned Italy’s 
refoulement practices.152  The claim for violations of Art. 3 and Art. 4 of 
Protocol 4 was brought to the ECtHR by eleven Eritreans and thirteen 
Somalis who were part of a larger group of people stopped at sea by the 
Italian Guardia Costiera while trying to reach the Italian coast.153  After 
being intercepted in international waters, the three boats containing about 
two hundred people were returned to Tripoli.154  The Italian authorities did 
not investigate the identity of the migrants stopped or whether they wanted 
to ask for asylum; instead, they took the migrants’ personal belongings, 
including their identification documents.155  Even if intercepted in 
international waters, the ECtHR found that Italy’s jurisdiction applied to 
the individuals stopped the moment they engaged in the refoulement of the 
migrants, and thus held Italy responsible for failing to uphold the principles 
outlined in the ECHR.156   
In reaching its conclusion, the ECtHR took into consideration the fact 
that Italy returned the migrants to Libya, a country that it knew, thanks to 
the extensive amount of reports from international organizations, would 
expose these individuals to degrading treatment, and potentially return 
them to countries such as Eritrea and Somalia, where human rights 
violations are also widespread.157  The existence of agreements between 
Libya and Italy that mention the respect of human rights, the Court 
stressed, did not on their own guarantee that Libya would comply with 
them, especially because it is not party to the ECHR or of the 1951 
Convention.158 
In fact, because Libya did not ratify the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 
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Protocol on the Status of Refugees, the country lacks an asylum system, 
and even the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has had difficulties 
operating in the country.  Despite its refusal to join these treaties, some 
have advanced the argument that Libya is still bound by the principle of 
non-refoulement because it has the force of custom and, some argue, even 
of jus cogens, meaning that the principle is so widely recognized as to 
apply regardless of being or not parties to the relevant treaties.  On the one 
hand, this argument might be invalidated by the consistent objector 
principle, whereby a state that consistently acted in a manner not in 
accordance with a legal principle is not bound by customary law.  The fact 
that Libya signed CAT and, with it, its Art. 3 prohibiting refoulement, on 
the other hand, might provide support to the idea that Libya is in fact bound 
by this principle, because it already accepted it elsewhere.  
In any case, Italy is once again trying to shield itself from international 
obligations in delegating authority to Libya.159  In fact, by having Libyan 
officials intercept boats and return migrants and refugees alike to the North 
African coast, Italy is trying to avoid another sentence like the one in Hirsi.  
At the very least, it is undeniable that the conduct of Libyan border patrols 
stopping migrants at sea is the exact same one condemned in the 2012 
ECtHR case. 
State Responsibility 
The most compelling argument challenging Italy’s involvement in 
Libyan operations at sea and in its detention and return of migrants is that 
the agreement may still make Italy accountable for human rights violations 
based on State Responsibility principles.  In fact, Asgi claimed that Italy 
and the EU are delegating migration control practices to Libya, but are still 
maintaining control over its operations and de facto violating the principle 
of non-refoulement.160  
The International Law Commission (ILC) issued the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility,161 which, despite not being treaty law, are widely 
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accepted by the international community as customary law.162  In Art. 2, the 
ILC outlined how a state is directly responsible for its wrongful acts, and 
that is “when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable 
to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State.”   
In the commentary of Chapter IV of the ILC Draft articles, it is 
explained that, while each state is responsible for its own wrongful acts and 
violations of international law, there are situations in which “internationally 
wrongful conduct [..] results from the collaboration of several States rather 
than of one State acting alone.”163  In fact, even if not held directly 
accountable, Italy may still be responsible for wrongful acts when it “aids 
or assists” in the commission of an internationally wrongful act or exercises 
“direction and control” over the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act if “(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the 
internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally 
wrongful if committed by that State.”164  Therefore, Italy could be held 
responsible for wrongful acts if either its own officials or government 
agencies are directly involved in violations of international instruments, or 
if it “aids or assists” Libya in committing an internationally wrongful act or 
it “directs or controls” the commission of an internationally wrongful act.   
If the Italian Guardia Costiera or other Italian authorities engaged 
directly in the refoulement of migrants, Italy could be held directly 
responsible for those wrongful acts, because it is in violation of 
international instruments that it ratified.  This is reinforced by the ruling of 
the ECtHR in Hirsi, and is probably the reason why Italy has been avoiding 
such conduct and delegating the job to Libya.   
However, when Italy provides Libyan authorities with vessels and 
border patrol instruments to intercept migrants at sea and return them to the 
Libyan coast, Italy’s conduct seems to fall squarely within the language of 
Art. 16.  Italy is in fact supplying Libya with all the necessary means to 
block migrants and then either detain them in conditions that violate basic 
human rights or return them to countries where they could be harmed, 
aiding and assisting Libya in perpetrating international law violations.   
Italy is well aware that Libya is committing the violations, satisfying 
Art. 16 (a).  This is particularly true given the number of reports on human 
rights conditions in the country that are available and given the discussion 
between the Committee Against Torture and Italian representatives where 
Italy displayed awareness of the situation.  The requirement under Art. 16 
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(b) is also satisfied in that if Italy were to commit these acts itself, it would 
be violating the principles of non-refoulement expressed in CAT, in the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol on Refugees, as well as human 
rights laws expressed in European Human Rights treaties.  Therefore, even 
if Libya is the state directly engaging in the illegal conduct. Italy might still 
have to take at least a share of the blame under State Responsibility 
principles, even though only to the extent of the assistance given.165  
In addition, it can be argued that Italy’s conduct rises to the level of 
“direction and control” identified under Art. 17 of the ILC Draft Articles; if 
that is the case, Italy could be held responsible for the wrongful act itself.  
According to the article’s commentary: 
 
“the term “controls” refers to cases of domination over the 
commission of wrongful conduct and not simply the exercise of 
oversight, still less mere influence or concern. Similarly, the word 
“directs” does not encompass mere incitement or suggestion but 
rather connotes actual direction of an operative kind.”166  
 
Italy’s financial and logistical assistance to Libya in its interception, 
detention, and forcible return operations is likely to be more significant 
than oversight or “mere influence.”  Heavier evidence, other than the 
financial support, of close control or direction might be needed, however, 
in order to prove Italy’s responsibility for Libya’s wrongful conduct.   
In Nicaragua v. US, the International Court of Justice applied the 
“effective control” test to decide whether to attribute the wrongful acts of a 
Nicaraguan paramilitary group, the contras, to the U.S., which was 
assisting them financially and equipping them with weapons.167  The court 
held that the U.S. did not have “effective control” because it did not 
directly instruct the contras as to the specific operations in which violations 
occurred.168  The same test was applied in Bosnia v. Serbia, where the 
International Court of Justice decided that the genocide committed in 
Srebrenica could not be attributed to Serbia.169  None of the armed groups 
involved, the court held, was so completely dependent on Serbia as to 
warrant attribution, regardless of the financial, political, military, and 
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logistical relations between them.170  A similar, yet less narrow test, was 
applied in Prosecutor v. Tadić.171  Under the “overall control” test, the state 
needs to wield overall control over the group, not merely by equipping and 
financing it, but by “coordinating or helping in the general planning” of its 
operations.172   
Though these tests were developed in relation to the conduct of 
individuals or groups to be attributed to states, they may still be relevant in 
the situation of a state’s conduct in connection to the wrongful acts of 
another state.  It seems, therefore, that under both the overall control and 
the effective control tests Italy’s financial and logistical assistance to Libya 
may not be sufficient to hold the country responsible for the wrongful acts.  
If, however, more evidence exists as to Italy’s coordinating and planning 
Libya’s operations, Italy’s conduct could fall under Art. 17, meaning that it 
would then be directly responsible for Libya’s violations of international 
law.   
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness 
There are six circumstances identified under the ILC Draft articles that 
could justify or serve as defenses for a country’s wrongful conduct, 
relieving it of its responsibility under international law in a specific 
situation.  Only two, however, could realistically come into play in Italy’s 
case.  The first circumstance is force majeure, which, under Art. 23 is the 
“occurrence of an irresistible force or unforeseen event beyond the control 
of the state making it impossible for the state to avoid the wrongful act.”173  
Italy could, for example, claim that the current migratory crisis or the 
enormous loss of lives at sea due to the crossings present a situation of 
force majeure justifying financing Libya to keep migrants within its 
borders.  In New Zealand v. France, however, the ad-hoc France-New 
Zealand Arbitration Tribunal held that this circumstance occurs when it 
really is “materially impossible” for a state to comply with its international 
obligations, and it usually refers to involuntary and unintentional 
conduct.174  Italy cooperating with Libyan authorities to return migrants is 
anything but involuntary conduct, and it is unlikely that any court would 
find it materially impossible for Italy to avoid engaging in it.   
Another justification is that of the state of necessity, which is invoked 
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“for a state to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril and does not seriously impair an essential interest of the state or of the 
international community.”175  Italy could thus argue its essential interest is 
preserving its national security against burdensome migration flows.  
However, the easy counterargument to this idea is that Italy’s conduct 
impairs the international community’s interest to protect refugees and 
human rights, which is evidenced by the large number of international 
covenants to safeguard these principles. 
Italy’s Alternatives to Avoid Responsibility for Wrongful Acts 
If Italy wants to pursue its commitments under the MoU without 
incurring responsibility for Libya’s wrongful acts, it should then take active 
steps to prevent them.  On the one hand, Italy could promote a 
counterbalancing policy by providing a legal route for people in need of 
international protection.  These “humanitarian corridors” would ensure that 
those with credible claims for asylum receive the assistance they need 
under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and prevent their 
refoulement to their countries of origin.  Most importantly, they would 
provide migrants with a not only legal but also safer alternative to paying 
smugglers and human traffickers to cross the Mediterranean and risk their 
lives. 
On the other hand, Italy could condition its funds on Libya’s 
compliance with international human rights.  Even if Libya has not ratified 
certain international treaties, nothing prevents Italy from requiring Libya to 
increase its human rights standards in detention centers.  Italy could also 
provide human rights trainings to Libyan officials and ensure that the 
funding it is making available to Libya for its detention centers is used to 
improve detention conditions rather than for their expansion.  Ideally, Italy 
could use its economic influence over Libya also to have it sign the 1951 
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol or at least put an asylum system in 
place.   
Even if these projects are implemented, however, the issue remains 
that Libya is a politically fragmented state and that discrimination is 
widespread, creating dangerous conditions for migrants regardless of 
Italy’s efforts.  However, Italy’s claimed development operations in the 
country might very well help improve this difficult situation.  In any case, 
Italy has sufficient leverage to demand that Libya at least improves its 
compliance with basic human rights standards, and it has an interest in 
doing so to prevent being held responsible for internationally wrongful 
acts.  
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Conclusion 
Italy is a party to numerous international human rights conventions, 
some of which are not mentioned in this article.  It has an obligation, 
therefore, to engage in conduct that upholds those rights.  By agreeing to 
support Libya in operations of refoulement and in the detention of 
economic migrants and refugees alike in subpar conditions, Italy risks 
breaching its obligations.  Following Hirsi et al. v. Italy, it is clear that Italy 
may not directly engage in the forcible return of individuals without 
committing a violation against EU human rights treaties.  In addition, 
despite not directly violating CAT or the Refugee Convention or Protocol 
and their principle of non-refoulement, Italy may still be held responsible, 
even if just in part, for Libya’s unlawful conduct because of Italy’s 
significant assistance and support to Libyan operations.  In order to avoid 
being held accountable for Libya’s wrongful acts, Italy needs to push for a 
significant shift in its cooperation with Libya.  This could most effectively 
occur by conditioning its funds to Libya on Libya’s commitment to respect 
human rights and stop returning individuals to countries where they may be 
harmed.  If this shift were not to occur, Italy would fail its commitment to 
the respect of human rights, the prohibition against torture, and the 
protection of refugees which it promised decades ago, and it would do so 
solely to stop waves of migrants that will likely continue to arrive through 
other routes with or without an agreement with Libya.   
 
